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Assessing the Leadership of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of China: Xi Jinping
Michael Montemalo
Abstract
President Xi Jinping is a pivotal
actor on the world stage and holds powerful
positions within both the Chinese
government and the Chinese Communist
Party. Assessing the president of the
Peoples Republic of China (PRC) is an
increasingly important subject as the United
States shifts more diplomatic and military
resources to Pacific to implement their Pivot
to Asian strategy. The aim of this paper is
to evaluate academic literature that focuses
on Xi Jinping as the current leader of the
People’s Republic of China. That
information will then be analyzed using
techniques derived from literature on
political leadership studies such as political
psychology. The literature from two schools
of political leadership study will be applied
to the presidency of Xi Jinping resulting in a
comprehensive assessment of his leadership
style.
Introduction
Xi Jinping, Chairman of the Central
Military Commission took over as the
General Secretary of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of China (CCP) in
2012. He was born in Beijing to Xi
Zhongxuan, an original leader of the CCP
during the time of Mao Zedong. Xi Jinping
was privileged to have a good education
despite his youth working among peasants in
lice-infested fields and living in a cave in the
western provinces. After being forced to
leave Beijing, he worked his way into the
CCP at an early age, always supporting the
Communist Party and working hard as
provincial secretary of both rural and urban
centers in the Fujian province. His
upbringing and allegiance to the CCP may
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play a role in the style of his leadership.
There are also environmental factors of
politics at play, which may account for his
actions during his presidency, as well as any
future actions. The weakening of the
Chinese Communist Party, as well as
regional and global power politics with
Washington, Tokyo, Moscow, and
Pyongyang, may be forcing Xi Jinping to act
in ways he otherwise would not. The
relationship between Washington and
Beijing is becoming increasingly significant
in the 21st century as China grows into a
peer competitor to the long established
primacy of the United States. Events such
as the pro-Democracy protests in the Special
Administrative Region of Hong Kong,
disputes over the Diaoyu Islands (Senkaku
Islands), and an increasingly erratic North
Korea have promoted increased cooperation
and brinkmanship between the two powers.
A lot is at stake, and the largest regional
actor is being led by a man who should be
assessed if the United States is to determine
how to act and react to his actions, and
defend its interests. This begs the question:
Is Xi Jinping leading China based on his
own individual leadership style, or is he
being affected by systemic or domestic
pressures that are out of his control?
Xi Jinping: The Individual
An individual’s background can
predict a lot about his character, personality,
and leadership style. Growing up as a
believer in the CCP, as well as being well
educated, Xi steadily worked his way up the
political hierarchy until the mid-1980s,
where his career in the CCP reached a new
level. Garnaut (2012) explains that “when
Xi describes himself as ‘always a son of the
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Yellow Earth [Referring to agriculture
around the Yangtze River],’ he was setting
up his personal narrative as a leader, who
has toiled with the masses, in contrast with
increasingly corrupt governing elite.” Xi
was born in 1953 and was fortunate to move
from Beijing to the western provinces as a
child. The Cultural Revolution rocked
Beijing, and he was spared from taking part
in the red terror. Having experience in both
rural and urban environments, as well as in
different levels of government and
bureaucracy, Xi Jinping “acquired a
reputation as a realistic, efficient, and
relaxed Party Secretary, conscious of the
need for China to move towards a market
economy” (Cabestan 2012). Described as a
modernizer, Cabestan (2012) analyzes Xi
Jinping’s political motives, explaining how
“he tried to improve and simplify the
administrative machine ... [and] make the
processes of selection and promotion of
government cadres more transparent.”
Moreover, Xi is simultaneously described as
a realist in that he is conscious of
environmental issues, needs to upgrade
industry for the 21st Century. He is also
aware of conflicts between domestic leaders
in business; he operates off of the slogan,
‘coordination and balance.’ In sum,
Cabestan (2012) profiles Xi Jinping as a
conservative but flexible modernizer,
assessing him as “pragmatic, a modernizer,
and even reformist.” On the contrary,
Cabestan (2012) also assesses Xi to be “a
cautious, orthodox leader, unwilling in his
actions, style, and even more so in his
private life to depart from the norm
authorized by the Party and to expose
himself to attacks by his detractors.” Xi is a
good organizer and coordinator. He was
able to put these traits into practice
successfully in 2008 while in charge of the
preparations for the Beijing Olympic
Games.
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Miller (2008) provides an assessment
of the new Politburo, which includes Xi
Jinping as leader of the Standing
Committee. The Politburo oversees the
Communist Party of China and the power is
consolidated in the Politburo Standing
Committee (PBSC). Miller states that “the
new Politburo leadership attributes over the
past two decades has increased…It is the
best-educated leadership in PRC history,
less thoroughly technocratic, and still starkly
civilian in experience.” Xi leads the
Politburo with advanced degrees in law and
chemical engineering. As Miller (2013)
explains, one of the first things Xi did in
office was downsize the nine member
Politburo Standing Committee to seven
members. This may have been an effort to
consolidate his power and isolate executive
decision making from the rest of the CCP.
Xi Jinping’s leadership style can be
described as unilateral in the methods of his
thinking, although he has to reconcile his
aspirations with the reality posed by the
structure of the Chinese government.
Xi Jinping is further attempting to
change the agenda of Chinese grand
strategy. Formerly, the Chinese grand
strategy focused on economic development,
while today Xi is more interested in
fostering Chinese hegemony in the region.
Chen (2014) suggests that “Xi seems to have
shifted from [Deng Xiaoping’s] ‘keeping a
low profile’ principle” of Chinese national
strategy. Chen (2014) goes on to explain,
“what has been emphasized is the need to be
active in foreign affairs because without this
it would be impossible to realize the Chinese
Dream and the great national rejuvenation
which Xi has emphasized.” The Chinese
Dream describes a set of personal and
national ideals in the People's Republic of
China and the Communist Party of China. It
is used by journalists, government officials,
and activists to describe the role of the
individual in Chinese society as well as the
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goals of the ‘Chinese nation.’ This is
incredibly important because both the CCP,
as well as the State Council, have strongly
opposed the shift away from a focus on
domestic economic development that has
been used to foster the Chinese Dream.
Chen (2014) argues that “also important is
how Chinese leaders assess the international
environment in the future.” Assertive
foreign policy behavior from Beijing and
ultimately Xi Jinping will lead to them
acting ambitiously based on the belief that
China is still in a period of strategic
opportunity and confidence. This is
evidence that Xi is acting against the
political environment and leading based on
personal goals and ambition.
Elizabeth Economy (2014) states that
“Chinese President Xi Jinping has
articulated a simple but powerful vision: the
rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” During
a time of political weakness within the CCP,
Economy (2014) states that “Xi has reacted
to this sense of malaise with a power grab—
for himself, for the Communist Party, and
for China. Xi rejected the communist
tradition of collective leadership, instead
establishing himself as the paramount leader
within a tightly centralized political system.”
Domestically, Xi put forth economic
reforms that would bolster the market while
allowing the state to retain significant
control. He sought to elevate China by
expanding trade and investment, creating
new international institutions, and
strengthening the military. This is his
vision, his agenda, and it goes against the
policy of ‘lying low,’ which has been in
place since the 1990s. Economy (2014)
argues that although “the roots of Xi’s
foreign policy predate his presidency—he
has replaced the decades-old mantra of the
former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping, ‘hide
brightness, cherish obscurity,’ with a far
more expansive and muscular foreign
policy.” Economy (2014) further states that
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“Xi’s nationalist rhetoric and assertive
military posture pose a direct challenge to
U.S. interests in the region and call for a
vigorous response.” This is a significant
divergence from the CCP strategy of
focusing on developing stable market
relations within the region and with the
United States.
Beyond foreign policy agenda, is the
number one objective for the People’s
Republic today, ‘the Chinese Dream.’ Bin
He (2013) writes that “the China Dream as
Xi Jinping puts it is the ‘great renaissance’
of the Chinese nation—Xi is trying to
project the vision that China will be number
one; China will be back on top and lead the
world.” Although the China Dream, or
Chinese Dream, may seem like a reboot of
Hu Jintao’s two 100-year plans, Xi has made
it his own and is using it to solidify the
CCPs position until at least the next decade.
For Xi, the continuity of the Communist
Party is a priority, especially now in a time
of waning influence caused by widespread
corruption. He (2013) argues that
“understanding Xi’s dream is of great
importance—it may provide some clue as to
which direction Xi will lead China.” It is
evident today that Xi favors an assertive
China that is active in international affairs;
Xi is doing as much as he can to push his
agenda forward without being put into the
light of the CCP. Essentially, Xi is acting
on his plans while being conservative
enough as to not draw too much attention
from the Communist establishment.
Individual Style Analysis
The study of individual leadership
styles, characteristics, and personality is
difficult to execute without quantifiable
measurements, but it can be easier by
comparing specific cases. Most heads of
government are privileged with the duty to
command their nation on the international
stage as the principal foreign affairs officer.
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The President of the United States (POTUS)
is the Commander in Chief of the Armed
Forces; the President of China, Xi Jinping is
the Chairman of the Central Military
Commission as well as the head of
government. Xi, like the POTUS, has the
ability to control military forces and interact
with other international actors as the
principal statesman; both chief military
commander and chief diplomat. Observing
Xi Jinping’s leadership in relation to
Chinese foreign affairs is therefore a
methodologically sound way to assess his
presidency, because compared to domestic
affairs Xi has more control over decision
making.
In order to truly understand Xi
Jinping as a leader, it is important to assess
him as an individual. According to David
Winter (2013), “[O]ne of the central axioms
of political psychology is that political
structures and actions are shaped and
channeled by people’s personalities—that is,
by their individually patterned integration of
processes of perception, memory, judgment,
goal-seeking, and emotional expression and
regulation.” This is interesting because it
suggests that presidential personality can
shape the outcomes of very important
political structures.
Dyson and Preston state that
“individual complexity has been linked to
how attentive or sensitive individuals are to
information from their surrounding political
or policy environments and to the extent to
which they require information from when
making decisions” (2006, 267).
Interestingly, individual complexity has
been linked to a leader’s style of decision
making, use of advisors, and the way they
process information within their decision
groups. The indicator of a true presidential
style and trait emerges during a time of
national emergency. In particular, when
foreign policy decisions must be made
immediately, the president must use and in
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turn reveal his true character, leadership
style, and cognitive ability. Xi Jinping is a
hard core Chinese Communist with a life
expressed by hard work and self-reliance.
From the literature on Xi as an individual, it
is clear that he is cautious but ambitious,
coordinated and balanced. Xi is not one to
publically ‘toe the party line’ and privately
follow the status quo. Even though he wants
the same ends as the Central Committee, a
strong China, he wants to achieve those ends
by a different set of means. His agenda, the
China Dream, is an excellent example.
Although taken from his processor Hu
Jintao, as He (2013) states, Xi has made it
his own, with his own agenda. Moreover,
Xi has exhibited assertiveness as well as
high achievement striving not only by way
of his rise in the political sphere but when he
was nominated president by the Politburo he
changed the institution, the Politburo
Standing Committee, from nine members to
seven.
Xi Jinping: Leading the Political
Behemoth
China’s government and communist
party structure is complex, corrupt, and
massive. The CCP alone has over 80 million
members as staff, bureaucrats, or in
leadership positions. The State Council, the
Politburo (Political Bureau), and the Central
Military Commission (CMC) exhibit
immense clout over national decisionmaking and implementation. Cheng (2013)
argues that “China’s ‘economy-first’
mentality toward [Northeast Asia] remains
unchanged from the previous administration
of [Hu Jintao]—This means that vigorous
growth during Xi’s first term will be
critical.” Cheng (2013) looks back at the Hu
Jintao’s administration and how a focus on
regional stability and economic growth was
in line with China’s grand strategy. In the
PRC, development of the market comes first
and Xi is going to have to reconcile with
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that reality. Cheng (2013) cites a “split”
within China’s government:
on one hand…China naturally
nurtures ambitions to return to its
former primacy and to be accepted
as a regional leader China needs to
pass the tests of regional leadership,
including the denuclearization of the
Korean Peninsula—On the other
hand…China still wants North
Korea’s cooperation as a bulwark
against a U.S. aligned movement on
its periphery.
This poses a major challenge for Xi and his
government. As he attempts to push forth his
own agenda, the more real bulwark may be
the CCP.
In addition to this, Xi is faced with
increasing opposition to implement his more
assertive agenda of regional primacy.
Christensen (2011) argues that “Beijing’s
new, more truculent posture is rooted in an
exaggerated sense of China’s rise in global
power and serious domestic political
insecurity—As a result, Chinese
policymakers are hypersensitive to
nationalist criticism at home and more rigid,
at times even arrogant, in response to
perceived challenges abroad.” Xi must
balance both domestic and international
pressures while pursuing his agenda. It is
becoming increasingly difficult to pursue the
modernization of the Peoples Liberation
Army (PLA) and regional hegemony if there
is still support for a focus on economic
development and neutral relations with the
international community. Although Xi
Jinping is described as a modernizer,
Christensen (2011) explains that “driven by
the fear of a precipitous collapse of a
neighboring communist regime and the
reduction of Chinese influence on the
Korean Peninsula, Beijing has fallen back
on long-held conservative Communist Party
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foreign policy principles in backing North
Korea.” Moreover, a weakening of the CCP
in recent years has led to increased zeal from
China’s top leaders. This has enabled Xi to
clean up the CCP and pursue an effective
anti-corruption campaign that has brought
down several high-ranking CCP officers,
both civilian and military, however there is
increased pressure on Xi himself.
Additionally, Xi’s vision for the
modernization of the PLA may be difficult
to attain. Garnaut (2013) uses a quote by
Mao Zedong to argue his point: “the
people’s army is not merely an organ for
fighting; it is an organ for the political
advancement of the party.” He claims that
Mao’s statement has been confirmed by all
of his successors and that “Xi may be able to
build a military that either is modern and
capable or loyal and political—But many in
China now believe he can’t have both”
(Garnaut 2013). Xi has to pursue his agenda
against the status quo and although it seems
as if he is doing this successfully, there are
forces within the CCP acting against him.
The largest problems are dissent within the
Politburo against the shift in the PLA, as
well as the more urgent problem of
unchecked corruption throughout the entire
military apparatus.
Assessment of the Working Environment
The Chinese government is a
complex mass of positions that enable
centralized control and communal decision
making. The Chinese Communist Party
consists of the National Party Congress of
the Chinese Communist Party that elects the
200 or so members of the Central
Committee. The Central Committee then
selects the 25 member Politburo that in turn
‘elects’ the nine [now seven] members of
the Politburo Standing Committee. Xi
Jinping is the General Secretary of the Party,
the Head of State, and the Chairman of the
Central Military Commission. The
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Politburo oversees the Secretariat which in
turn oversees the implementation of the
Politburo Standing Committee’s agenda.
The Government of the Peoples Republic of
China is separate but equal to the CCP, and
consists of the National People’s Congress
(NPC). The NPC is the unicameral
legislature that oversees the State Council
which is the civil service equivalent to the
Politburo, and has equal domestic clout
albeit they work together. To reiterate,
China’s complex and massive civil service
system, as well as the separate and equally
massive and complex Communist Party
system, greatly hinders the effectiveness of
any single person in power.
To put this into methodological
perspective, pluralist theorists such as
Theodore Lowi (1985), and rational choice
theorists such as Terry Moe (1993) contend
that the modern presidency “is so
institutionalized, and to such a degree a
prisoner of excessive public expectations
and other external constraints, that the
personality of the occupant matters
relatively little in terms of political
outcomes.” A central criticism from both
pluralists and rational choice theorists is that
“personality theory is a quagmire of illusive
concepts, intuition, and subjective
frameworks” (George 1974; Greenstein
1969). If the Chinese presidency is any
indicator of institutionalized leadership, the
personal character and ambitions of Xi
Jinping matter little to none in the grand
scope of the CCP.
Research on political leadership and
decision making suggests that leaders vary
systematically in their orientations toward
constraints. The article by Johnathan Keller
develops an integrative theoretical
framework that explicitly incorporates these
insights and applies them to the domain of
crisis decision making. “Leaders’ scores on
key characteristics (based on at-a-distance
assessment methods) are used to identify
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their expected inclination to challenge or
respect domestic constraints” (Keller 2005,
837). Interestingly, the logic behind this
argument lies in the context of the
individual’s presidency, administration, etc.
“Domestic constraints that presumably
excerpt either a pacifying or incendiary
influence on decision makers include public
opinion, power-sharing institutional
arrangements, institutionalized opposition,
and norms involving dispute resolution”
(Keller 2005, 837). Normalized models
assume that these external constraints are
extremely powerful and are unlikely to be
circumvented by decision makers.
Although, research also suggests that the
assumed causal mechanisms underlying the
constraints suggests that “most of these are
appropriately viewed as potential constraints
vis-à-vis the immediate decision making
process” (Keller 2005, 837). Moreover,
differentiation in leadership styles will allow
decision makers to react and act differently
within varied domestic political constraints.
The grand hypothesis that Keller puts forth
is that “one of the defining attributes of
constraint challengers is their reliance upon
internal belief, principals, and perceptions as
a guide to decision making” (2005, 843). It
is difficult to believe otherwise that this is
not suggesting that external factors play a
role in decision making processes of leaders.
The biggest constraint put on the CCP are
domestic, nationalistic rhetoric and civil
protest against corruption are putting a lot of
pressure on the Chinese government.
Even in the area of international
affairs, Xi Jinping is restricted by the other
members of the Politburo who, as a
collective, decide on the agenda of the CCP.
China has a grand strategy that’s sole
objective is Chinese primacy on the
international stage, as well as domestic
development of a market based economy.
China dreams of being a global hegemon, an
economic superpower, and to have the
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China Dream. The literature is clear about
these aspirations, but it is also clear that Xi
Jinping has a lot of pressure coming from
Beijing.
Personal Analysis: Individual versus
Systemic Affect
Xi Jinping is one of the most
powerful men on the earth as the President
of China. He is the General Secretary of the
Chinese Communist Party as well as the
Chairman of the Central Military
Commission. Both institutions represent a
large degree of clout, both domestically and
internationally. Xi is a determined leader,
one who is doing what he can to make sure
his agenda is implemented, and he is doing
so in a way that he will not be stopped by
the vast CCP political machine. Intelligent
and driven, coordinated and balanced, Xi
Jinping is leading. On the other hand, Xi is
restricted by a complex and redundant
system of government that is collectively
responsible for China’s future. Both the
Central Committee and the Politburo put
immense institutional pressures on the
presidency that may have great effect on any
individual actions that Xi may otherwise
make. China has a reputation for being
cautious and remaining neutral. This may
be attributed to these outside forces
preventing Xi, or any other PRC leader for
that matter, from being the statesman they
want to be; they are preventing Xi from
being assertive and decisive on the world
stage.
Literature Assessment
There are inherent problems with
literature of this kind. First, Xi Jinping is a
sitting president, and academic literature
assessing his presidency is few and far
between. Moreover, a lot of the literature
originating out of China is censored or
fabricated, so all analyses of Chinese
sources were conducted cautiously. The
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structure of Chinese politics is large,
complex, and enigmatic. Transparency and
efficiency are not a strong suit for the
government or the party, therefore
information regarding the two may be
distorted or fragmented. Additionally, Xi
Jinping is known to act in the shadows,
meaning that he will do or say something
that cannot be easily traced back to him.
Literature was vague and had to be
assessed in depth; some authors did not
write about Xi’s leadership directly, but
wrote more directly on the challenges that
he and the CPP are facing. This information
was difficult to propagate into a coherent
review because the individual and the
systemic effects in regards to leadership
studies were hardly addressed directly. The
sources that were reviewed mostly used
evidence derived from speculation or from
Xi’s past before his presidency. This
information was useful to gain an idea of
what might be happening in Beijing, but it is
nothing compared to first-hand knowledge
of Xi Jinping.
Research into the political
psychology of presidents and the effect on
foreign policy decision-making is as
complex as it is divided. Two distinct
schools are constantly evolving and
developing theories and hypotheses in order
to understand how certain policy outcomes
occur. On one side of the argument,
researchers believe the environment of the
leader shapes policy, whether it is systemic,
domestic, and/or the administration itself.
On the other hand, researchers argue and
develop methodologies to test the theory that
individual presidential or leader personality
and behavior drives policy outcomes. Both
sides have a substantial amount of quality
research that they employ to back up their
claims.
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Conclusion
Xi Jinping is an ambitious leader.
He is a modernizer and a reformer who is
attempting to balance with a hard line
communist party background. Chinese
politics are complex; on one hand great
effort is made to maintain the CCP’s
legitimacy, but on the other hand great effort
is also put into developing a globally
integrated market economy. The size and
scope of the Chinese government and party
hinder the individual ability of Xi Jinping to
act as he wishes, to be assertive and
effective. Xi is an intelligent person who
has years of experience within the CCP,
however and he knows how to play the
system in order to get what he wants without
being caught. Xi Jinping is a dynamic
leader; a leader who can be both a great
reformer and also an old-school communist
conservative. Overall, there simply is not
enough quantitative or qualitative data that
is empirically accurate enough to connect
claims of causation. As for the external
variables, without clear examples and an
empirically significant section of cases to
reinforce causal claims, the theories will
never be able to transition into fact. The
hypothesis that systemic, domestic, or
administrative variables can have effect on
presidential decision-making is sound
however, gathering and applying data is
difficult and rarely is not qualitative in
nature. As for Xi Jinping, the CCP has
attempted to hold the status quo, but it
simply was not enough to contain their
leader. Xi has cracked down on corruption,
created the AIIB bank, acted aggressively in
the South China Sea, and has expanded
Chinese affairs into Africa. Moreover, Xi
has no desire to step down from his position;
he has not made any attempt to prepare a
successor and has made it obvious that he
intends to remain leader of China well into
the 2020s. Due to this clear assertion of
intention, it is more likely that Xi is running
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China than it is China that is running Xi.
His individual leadership is greater than both
systemic and domestic pressures.
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